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This review examines the biosafety systems of selected countries in the Eastern and Central Africa. The 
biosafety systems are meant to safeguard human health, animal health and the environment against 
any possible risks posed by development and application of modern biotechnology. Though the focus 
is in the Eastern and Central African region, the study gives an overview of worldwide biosafety 
frameworks as guided by the Cartagena protocol on biosafety. The Eastern and Central African 
countries covered in this study are Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). An attempt is made to assess the current status on the countries’ 
compliance to biosafety international conventions, institutional arrangements and regulatory regimes. 
A critical look is given to the existing biosafety frameworks, pinpointing their weaknesses and giving 
suggestions on what could be done to address the shortfalls. The study shows that Kenya is leading 
the group by having all the requirements in place, followed by Uganda. Tanzania has cleared the legal 
frameworks hurdles, but it is rather slow in processing applications of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) for containment and confined trials. Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi and DRC are still in the process 
of formulating their biosafety laws. The challenges facing the operationalization of the biosafety 
systems are financial constraints, insufficient trained human resources, poor facilities, low awareness 
and insufficient political will by some governments. It is argued that while biosafety frameworks stand 
to safeguard safe application of modern biotechnology, they should not have too stringent regulations, 
lest they impede the development of modern biotechnology in the Eastern and Central African region. 
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Biosafety is widely understood as risk assessment, 
management, regulation, communication and mitigation 
in regard to safe development and application of modern 
biotechnology. In broader terms, biosafety is the 
prevention of large-scale loss of biological integrity, 
focusing both on ecology and human health. It is related 
to several fields: In ecology, it refers to imported life 
forms from beyond eco-region borders; in agriculture it is 
concerned with reducing the risk of alien or transgenic 
genes, and reducing the risk of food bacterial 
contamination. In medicine, it refers to organs or tissues 
from biological origin or genetic therapy products; in 
chemistry it may refer to chemical pollutants in water 
such as polychlorobiphenlyls (PCBs) levels affecting 
fertility and related hazards. The international biosafety 
protocol deals primarily with the agricultural definition, but 
many advocacy groups seek to expand it to include post-
genetic threats such as new molecules and artificial life 
forms that may compete directly in the natural food chain 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biosafety). This review looks 
at not only agricultural aspects, but also biosafety 
aspects related to health and the environmental 
biotechnology in general. 
 
 
Concerns on modern biotechnology 
 
Concerns about modern biotechnology have mainly been 
directed to the living modified organisms (LMOs) or 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and their 
products. The main concerns lie on human health, animal 
health and abiotic environment. Under human health, 
there are concerns that genetically modified (GM) foods 
may contain novel protein toxins arising from introduction 
of foreign genes; they may also contain some proteins 





as allergic hypersensitivity. Also, it is feared that antibiotic 
resistance genes used as markers in genetic engineering 
may induce large-scale evolution of drug resistant 
bacteria (Hosea, 2004). 
Under animal health, concerns are raised when GMOs 
and their products are used as feeds for poultry, pigs and 
ruminants. There are also concerns on chemical 
compositions, nutritional parameters and digestibility of 
GM feeds. Quality of milk from cattle subjected to GM 
feed, risks on animals fed on herbicide-tolerant or insect-
protected crop silage are also considered. Concerns on 
the effect of GM feed on the bacteria present in the 
chicken gut can not be overruled. 
Concerns for the abiotic environment dwell mainly on 
possible negative ecological impacts that may be caused 
by GMOs. Loss of biodiversity due to the dominance of 
GM strains; emergence of „super weeds‟, gene escape 
and trans-genes effect are among them. On the other 
hand, direct and indirect side effects of GMOs on life 
support systems such as air, water and soil necessitate a 
thorough scrutiny before they can be used. Currently, 
other socio-economic controversies surrounding GMOs 
include products labeling to facilitate consumer choice, 
intellectual property rights related to ownership of the 
technology and ethical and cultural considerations in 
terms of community engagement and morality of 
modifying natural organisms (Hosea, 2004). 
 
 
International convention on biological diversity  
 
The brainchild behind biosafety systems is the 
International Convention on Biological diversity (CBD) 
which came into force in 1992. It recognizes the benefits 
of biotechnology and calls for safe management of 
biotechnology to ensure its safety to human health and 
the environment in general. Article 19.3 of CBD raises 
concerns on potential impact of biotechnology application 
and demands the precautions in safe handling of 
biotechnology products (http://www.cbd.int/). The CBD 
article has been the basis for the international biosafety 
regulatory systems, supplemented by the Cartagena 
protocol on biosafety (CPB).  
 
 
Cartagena protocol on biosafety 
 
The CPB is an international agreement which was 
adopted on 29th January 2000 and entered into force on 
11th September 2003. It is an international mechanism to 
regulate trans-boundary movement of LMOs. It also 
regulates trade and use of GM crops and derived foods. 
The main objective of CPB is “to contribute to ensuring 
an adequate level of protection in the field of safe 
transfer, handling and use of LMOs resulting from 
modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on 
the   conservation   and   sustainable   use   of   biological  




diversity, taking into account also of risks to human 
health and especial focusing on trans-boundary trade” 
(http://bch.cbd.int/protocol). The main feature of CPB is 
the use of the „Precautionary Principle‟ as a policy tool of 
regulation of LMOs especially in risk management. The 
Principle states that “If an action or policy has a 
suspected risk of causing harm to the public or 
environment, in the absence of scientific consensus that 
harm would not arise, the burden of proof falls on those 
who would advocate taking the action”. In general terms, 
it requires products to be proven safe before release to 
the market or into the environment (Bail et al., 2002; 
Cullet, 2006; Kinderlerer, 2008; www.ielcr.org). The 
protocol, however, excludes products of medical 
biotechnology application. The biosafety clearing house 
(BCH) is a mechanism set up by CPB to facilitate the 
exchange of information on LMOs and assist the parties 




Other biosafety-related international treaties and 
agreements 
 
The Agenda number 21 of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED; 
http://www.eoearth.org), also known as the Earth 
Summit, that took place in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 
2nd to 14th 1992, raised the issue of safe application of 
biotechnology and safeguarding the environment from 
impact of modern biotechnology. It resulted to formation 
of specific institutions or organs to deal with global 
environmental issues under the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) 
(http://www.unep.ch/biosafety). It also spearheaded the 
development of active environmental policies and 
regulations in over 100 developing countries including 
building capacity in developing biosafety policies and 
regulatory systems. Apart from CBD and CPB, there are 
a number of other international treaties related to 
biosafety:  
 
1) International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC; 
https://www.ippc.int) was formed in 1997. It is an 
international agreement on plant health with 177 current 
signatories. It aims to protect cultivated and wild plants by 
preventing the introduction and spread of pests. It also 
emphasizes on the need of protecting and conserving 
genetic resources associated with food and plant crops. 
2) Office International des Epizooties (OIE; 
http://www.oie.int) was established in 1924. Currently it 
has 172 member states and is led by an international 
Committee from member states with a Central Bureau 
elected by that Committee, which deals with the day-to-
day running of the organization. Its mandate includes 
setting of sanitary standards for the international 
movement of animals or animal products. 




3) International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture (PGRFA; 
http://www.planttreaty.org) was established in 2001. It 
enhances policies on conservation and sustainable use 
of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and 
ensures fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived 
from their use in food crops. It is also involved in the use 
of “Material Transfer Agreements” (MTAs) which is an 
aspect related to intellectual property (IP) issues related 
to CBD. 
4) Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC; 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net) was created in 1963 
by Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO; 
www.fao.org) and World Health Organization (WHO; 
www.who.int) to develop food standards, guidelines and 
related texts such as codes of practice under the Joint 
FAO/WHO Food Standards Program. The main purposes 
of this Program are to protect health of the consumers 
and ensuring fair trade practices in the food trade, and 
promoting coordination of all food standards. It also sets 
standards, guidelines and procedures for risk analysis 
and assessment of safety of food, including foods derived 
or produced from transgenic food crops and 
microorganisms.  
5) Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD; http://www.oecd.org) was founded 
in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade. 
It is a forum of countries committed to democracy and 
market economy, providing a platform to compare policy 
experiences, seeking answers to common problems, 
identifying good practices, and coordinating domestic and 
international policies of its members. 
6) International Centre for Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology (ICGEB; http://www.icgeb.org) was formed 
in 1983. The Centre is dedicated to advanced research 
and training in molecular biology, biotechnology and 
biosafety, and holds out the prospect of advancing 
knowledge and applying the latest techniques in the fields 
of biomedicine, crop improvement, environmental 
protection/remediation, biopharmaceuticals and 
biopesticide production. 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO; http://www.wto.org) 
Agreements dealing with biosafety and biotechnology 
issues are:  
 
1) The General agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT; 
http://www.gatt.org). It was signed in 1947 and lasted 
until 1993, when it was incorporated into the WTO 1995. 
The original GATT text (GATT, 1947) is still in effect 
under the WTO framework, subject to the modifications of 
GATT 1994. It advocates that GMOs and other products 
derived from them should be treated like conventional 
counterparts as long as they are safe. 
2) The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures - also known as the SPS 





negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the GATT, and 
entered into force with the establishment of the WTO. 
Under the SPS agreement, the WTO sets constraints on 
member-states‟ policies related to food safety (bacterial 
contaminants, pesticides, inspection and labeling).  
3) The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT; 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbtagr_e.htm) is 
concerned with animal and plant health and safety, and 
with product standards in general. It tries to ensure that 
regulations, standards, testing and certification 
procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles, while 
also providing members with the right to implement 
measures to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as 
protection of human health and safety, or the 
environment; and 
4) Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS;http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_
e.htm) which is an international agreement that sets 
down minimum standards for many forms of intellectual 
property (IP) regulation as applied to nationals of other 
WTO members. It was negotiated at the end of the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT in 1994. The TRIPS 
agreement introduced Intellectual Property Law into the 
international trading system for the first time and remains 
the most comprehensive international agreement that 
deals with IP issues. 
 
 
WORLDWIDE BIOSAFETY FRAMEWORKS 
 
Worldwide, by 2008 a total of 143 countries signed and 
became parties to the Cartagena protocol on biosafety 
(CPB) in the following distribution: Africa (40), Asia 
Pacific (37), Central and Eastern Europe (20), Latin 
America and Caribbean (25), Western Europe and other 
groups (21). However, it is noteworthy that some mega 
GMO-producing countries such as USA, Argentina, 
Canada, Uruguay and Australia who had already 
commercialised GMO crops, are yet to be members of 
CPB. Although it is encouraging to note that more than 
75% of the members of the CBD are now members of the 
CPB (http://www.cbd.int/biosafety/signinglist.shtml; 
Kinderlerer, 2008), in the world stage there are still fierce 
debates on the types of regulatory mechanisms, 
especially on the issue of liability and redress.  
The UNEP, through the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF; www.thegef.org), established worldwide projects 
on “development of national bioafety frameworks (NBF)” 
in July 2001. It supported developing countries that were 
already members of the CBD and CPB to set up their 
NBFs for the management of LMOs. Whilst allowing for 
countries specific situations, needs` and priorities, UNEP-
GEF Projects insisted on the inclusion of the following 
elements in their NBFs: Biosafety policies; regulatory 
regimes; systems to handle requests (administrative, risk 
assessment and management, decision making 





and enforcement); and public awareness and 




BIOSAFETY IN AFRICA 
 
The African countries that are members to CPB are 
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
(Kinderlerer, 2008). However, biosafety regulations and 
legislations are in place only in few African countries, and 
such limitation constitutes a serious constraint that 
impairs the use, evaluation and release of genetically 
modified organisms (Brink et al., 1998). South Africa, 
Egypt and Zimbabwe are the leading countries in 
developing functional GMO legislations, while other 
countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Malawi, 
Cote d‟Ivoire, Mauritius, Namibia and Zambia follow suit. 
The UNEP-GEF Project on Development of National 
Biosafety Frameworks supported at least 43 African 
countries (Morris and Koch, 2002). 
 
 
BIOSAFETY SYSTEMS IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL 
AFRICA 
 
The major objectives of biosafety systems in Eastern and 
Central Africa are: To establish a science-based, holistic 
and integrated, efficient, transparent participatory 
administrative and decision making system so that 
member countries can benefit from modern 
biotechnology while avoiding or minimizing the possible 
environmental, health, and socio-economic risks; and 
ensure that research, development, handling, trans-
boundary movement, transit, use, release and 
management of GMOs and products are undertaken in a 
manner that prevents or reduces risks to human and 
animal health, biological diversity and the environment in 
general (Jaffe, 2006; Sengooba, 2008). The Eastern 
African Regional Program and Research Network for 
Biotechnology, Biosafety and Biotechnology Policy 
Development (BIO-EARN; http://www.bio-earn.org) 
benefited Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.  
Founded in 1998, its aim, among others, was to 
promote collaboration in biotechnology and biosafety for 
member states (Mugoya and Bananuka, 2004). Kenya is 
regarded as East Africa‟s most advanced country in 
terms of combining biotechnology research capacity with 
the necessary policy frameworks and biosafety regulatory 
systems (Sithole-Niang et al., 2004). Burundi and 
Rwanda joined the East African Community (EAC) in July  




2007. Alongside with the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), a Central African vast country which is also lined 
up to join the EAC block, they are beneficiaries of the 
UNEP-GEF biosafety development project that helped 
them develop their national biosafety systems.  
 
 
Features of biosafety frameworks for Eastern and 
Central African countries  
 
The national biosafety frameworks (NBFs) in the Eastern 
and Central African countries covered in this study were 
drafted between 2001 and 2007. The NBFs for Tanzania, 
Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi and DRC 
have the following main features: 
 
1) Conceptual framework - the background and context of 
NBFs are given including the objectives, justification, 
scope and key elements; 
2) Review of national (sectoral and institutional) policies 
related to biosafety. These include, self assessments on 
agricultural, health, industrial, trade and environmental 
policies;  
3) Development of national biosafety policies and 
guidelines; 
4) Development of biosafety administrative systems – 
these include institutional arrangements, decision making 
mechanisms, risk assessment and management; 
5) Legal frameworks and regulatory regimes – they take 
on board existing biosafety-related legislations and their 
mechanisms; draft biosafety bills and biosafety laws; 
6) Monitoring, inspections and enforcement mechanisms; 
7) Institutional arrangements – these include 
administrative structures and decision making 
mechanisms as regards safe introduction and application 
of modern biotechnology; focal points, competent 
authorities, governmental and private institutional organs 
and all constituted committees; 
8) Public awareness, education and participation 
strategies; and  
9) Socio-economic and ethical considerations. 
 
 
NATIONAL BIOSAFETY FRAMEWORK FOR 
TANZANIA 
 
Following Tanzania‟s ratification of the CBD on 8th March 
1996, the government created an enabling environment 
for establishment of mechanisms for safe application of 
modern biotechnological research and development. The 
National Biosafety Framework (NBF; 
www.unep.org/biosafety/files/TZNBF, URT, 2005a) for 
Tanzania (TZ) was drafted by a multidisciplinary steering 
committee, coordinated by the Vice President‟s Office in 
October 2004 under the auspices of UNEP-GEF. It is a 
combination of policy, administrative, legal, and technical 
instruments that were developed to address safety issues  




with respect to human and animal‟s health, environmental 
conservation, as well as socio-economic and ethical 
concerns in the context of safe development and 
application of modern biotechnology in accordance to 
national needs and international legislation (URT, 2009).  
The main underlying principles of the TZ-NBF are strict 
liability, prior informed consent and precautionary 
approach. It aims at:  
 
1) Establishing science based, holistic and integrated, 
transparent and participatory administrative and decision 
making system so that Tanzania can benefit from modern 
biotechnology, while avoiding or minimizing the 
environmental, health and socio-economic risk; and 
2) Ensure that the research, development, handling, 
trans-boundary movement, transport, use, transfer, 
release and management of GMOs are controlled in a 
manner that does not cause any harm. 
 
The key elements of TZ-NBF are: Regulatory systems 
and means of implementing them, means of validating 
the presence of GMOs, means of enforcing the 




Tanzania biosafety regulations  
 
The Tanzania biosafety guidelines (2009) are based on 
the National Environmental Management Act (United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2004; CAP 191 (URT, 2004); 
government Notice No. 265 of 24th July 2009). They 
apply to the movement, use and commercial application 
of GMOs and their products. The TZ regulations cover 
the following areas: It gives preliminary provisions, 
general principles, administration and institutional 
arrangements, decision making procedures and approval 
mechanisms, risk assessment and management, GMO 
transportation, liability and redress, offenses and 
penalties, and general provisions (URT, 2005b). 
The main principles that are involved in the Tanzania 
biosafety regulation are the precautionary principle 
(approval or refusal should depend on clear scientific 
knowledge and lack of such knowledge shall not be used 
as a basis for not taking preventive measures); 
prevention principle (risk assessment and environmental 
impact assessment to be carried out so that informed 
decisions may be made); and the principle of strict liability 
(any party, individual or corporate that deals with the 
introduction of a GMO or its products shall be liable for 
any harm, injury or loss caused directly or indirectly by 
those GMOs and their products or any activity related). It 
further states that: “In case of harm to the environment or 
to biological diversity, redress shall include the costs of 
clean up and rehabilitation whether incurred or to be 
incurred and costs of any preventive measures to follow, 





is the right of individual and legal persons to seek redress 
in respect of breach or threatened breach of the 
(biosafety) regulations. Such persons shall not be 
expected to pay costs if their action failed, if it was out of 
reasonable concern. The stated penalties of offenders 
are monetary fines and prison terms. Most of the 
provisions given in the TZ biosafety regulations are a 
reflection of the CPB provisions (URT, 2005b). 
 
 
Tanzania NBF institutional arrangement  
 
The national biosafety focal point (NBFP) is the vice 
president‟s office (VPO; http://www.vpo.go.tz), division of 
environment. Its role and responsibilities include to: 
Review and approve biosafety applications for research, 
confined release, pre-commercial release; oversee the 
implementation of biosafety issues including collection 
and distribution of biosafety information to the public; 
establish contact and linkages with national, regional and 
international agencies or institutions; establish database 
for the purpose of facilitating collection, storage, retrieval 
and distribution of information relevant to biosafety; and 
establish and update a register of experts in 
biotechnology and biosafety (URT, 2005c). So far, the 
NBFP has issued a permit to only one research-based 
GMO application on virus resistant cassava while 3 
others (GM cotton, GM potato and GM maize) are being 
processed.  
The national biosafety committee (NBC) coordinated by 
the NBFP, is a multidisciplinary team of 15 members 
drawn from government, non-governmental organizations 
and private sector, including the academia. It consists of 
experts from the ministries of agriculture and food 
security, livestock development and fisheries, health and 
social welfare, industries trade, and also some members 
are drawn from the commission of science and 
technology (COSTECH; http://www.costech.or.tz), 
University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM; 
http://www.udsm.ac.tz), Muhimbili University of Health 
and Allied Sciences (MUHAS, http://www.muhas.ac.tz); 
Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA; 
http://www.suanet.ac.tz) and other related research and 
development (R and D) institutions. Its functions include 
to review relevant applications from NBFP; advice on 
biosafety policy, legislation and other instruments; ensure 
that adequate testing of GMOs developed elsewhere has 
been performed in the country of origin and propose 
mitigation measure to be undertaken in case of any 
accidental release; and review biosafety regulation 
guidelines from time to time as necessary. The TZ-NBC 
may perform any other assignment as directed by the 
NBFP. 
TZ-NBFP designates national competent authorities 
(NCAs), which are advisory sub-committees comprising 
of multidisciplinary team of expert in the field of 





applications or proposals for development, introduction, 
import, export, transit, contained use, release or placing 
on the market. In Tanzania, the agricultural biotechnology 
scientific advisory committee (ABSAC) is an example of a 
competent authority in agricultural biotechnology. 
Moreover, NBFP has established a network biosafety 
centre of excellence (CE) to oversee biosafety issues 
pertaining to training, GMOs detection, regulation and 
research in general. The CE is constituted by all 
biosafety-related institutions including Mikocheni 
Agricultural Research Institute, (MARI; www.mari.or.tz), 
National Medical Research Institute (NIMRI; 
http://nimr.or.tz), the Department of Molecular Biology 
and Biotechnology (DMBB; http://mbb.udsm.ac.tz) at 
UDSM, SUA, MUHAS, Ifakara Health Institute (IHI; 
http://www.ihi.org), Tanzania Food and Drug Authority 
(TFDA; http://www.tfda.or.tz), Tanzania Bureau of 
Standards (TBS; www.tbstz.or), Tanzania Pesticide 
Research Institute (TPRI; http://tpri.or.tz), Animal 
Diseases Research Institute (ADRI; www.mifugo.go.tz), 
Kizimbani Research Station, Zanzibar, and Tanzania 
Government Chemist Laboratories Agency (TGCLA; 
http://gcla.go.tz). 
Institutions in Tanzania that are involved in importing, 
exporting, handling, contained use, release or placing 
GMOs or GM products on the market are obliged to 
establish institutional biosafety committees (IBCs) to 
institute and control safety mechanisms and approval 
procedures at the institution level. Roles and 
responsibilities of TZ-IBCs are: To review the 
containment and confinement level required by guidelines 
for the proposed research; to make decision on the 
comparative ecological, economical, and social impacts 
or alternative approach to attain the objectives of the 
proposed GMOs; and to report to the relevant ministries 
and appropriate office in the concerned organization any 
significant GMOs activities, problems with or violation of 
regulation in any significant research related accidents or 
illness (URT, 2005c). In Tanzania, some of the functional 
IBCs are at MARI, NIMRI and DMBB-UDSM. 
 
 
Tanzania biosafety guidelines 
 
The Tanzania biosafety guidelines were developed 
alongside the NBF in 2005 (URT, 2005c). They apply to 
research, development, handling, transit, contained use, 
trans-boundary movement, release or placing of GMOs 
or their product on the market whether for release in the 
environment, for use as food, feed or processing. They 
are prepared with the view of ensuring their 
complimentarity and mutual supportiveness with the 
national policies and legislations. Tanzania biosafety 
guidelines spell out procedures on decisions making and 
decisions review, importation and exportation of GMOs, 
GMOs on transit, application procedures, GMO handling, 
transport, packaging and identification.  




Under risk assessment (RA), the guidelines emphasize 
on technical and non-technical procedures of gathering 
diverse data to identify possible risk in research and 
development involving GMOs, their processes or 
products. Its main objective is to identify and evaluate the 
potential adverse effects of GMOs, taking into account 
the potential risks on human and animal health, and to 
the environment. The underlying principles of RA are: 
Scientifically sound and transparent manner of execution; 
lack of scientific knowledge or consensus should not 
necessarily be interpreted as indicating a particular level 
of risk, or an absence of risk, or an acceptable risk; and 
that RA should be carried out on a case-by-case basis. 
Risk management (RM) is aimed at establishing and 
maintaining appropriate mechanisms, measures and 
strategies to regulate, manage and control risk identified 
in the risk assessment regarding the use, handling, 
introduction and field release of GMOs (Traynor, 1999; 
URT, 2005c). Risk management is conducted in 
contained and confined procedures. Whereas 
containment refers to safe methods of managing 
infectious agents or hazardous compounds in the 
laboratory environment, growth room or greenhouse 
where they are being handled or maintained in order to 
prevent escape outside the prescribed spaces in order to 
reduce exposure of potential hazardous agents, 
confinement, on other hand, is the use of controlled areas 
such as isolated and fenced, limited access fields to 
prevent GMO spread. The procedures and levels of 
physical, chemical and biological 
containment/confinement are stated in the TZ biosafety 
guidelines. Biosafety laboratory (preferably level 2) for 
basic research, confined field trials and pre-commercial 
testing are the chronological procedures that need to be 
followed. In Tanzania, biosafety level 2 containment 
facilities are at MARI, NIMRI and DMBB, while a confined 
GM maize trial site is set at Makutopora, Dodoma. 
In biosafety monitoring and enforcement processes, TZ 
guidelines define monitoring as a process of keeping 
track of activities so as to determine whether they meet 
the objectives with a purpose of gathering data on GMOs 
in order to assess its impact on biotic and abiotic 
environment. Both case-specific (short term, related to 
individual GMOs) and general (long-term observation) 
monitoring processes are adopted. It is carried out 
before, during and after introduction of GMOs. 
Monitoring, inspection, enforcement and supervision are 
performed by the competent authorities under the TZ-
NBFP. 
Under socio-economic, cultural and ethical 
considerations, the Tanzania biosafety guidelines cover a 
wide range of safety and non-safety issues which are 
relevant for general release of GMOs and their products. 
Issues related to intellectual property rights (IPR) such as 
patenting biotechnology innovations, protection of 
indigenous varieties and undisclosed traditional 
knowledge and biodiversity; implications of crossing with  




local varieties (GMOs contaminations), customer choices 
and contradictions to religious beliefs are highlighted. 
Biosafety communication and public participation are 
key to any successful safe development and application 
of biotechnology. Its objective is to educate the public 
about biosafety processes, inform the public about the 
specific risks associated with the GMOs and actions 
taken to alleviate them; improve communicators‟ 
understanding of public values and concerns; develop 
mutual trust between the developers, regulators and the 
public; reduce conflicts or controversies; promote 
transparency in the regulatory process and collect 
stakeholders‟ views. The types of biosafety risk 
communication strategies outlined in the Tanzania 
biosafety guidelines include public notices in-print and 
electronic media; scientific publications from expert 
groups and decision documents. As a rule, all GMO 
products should be labeled (URT, 2005a, b, c). 
It is noteworthy that although Tanzania is leading in 
having biosafety regulatory framework in place, it is 
lagging behind among other two East African Community 
(EAC) member states (Kenya and Uganda) in processing 
permits for GMOs research, import and applications. 
There seems to be poor political will and skepticism on 
the part of the decision makers. Equally, the public and 
private media are not educated enough on matters 
related to modern biotechnology, resulting to under-
reporting and sometimes distorted reporting about the 
technology. On the other hand, strict liability clause in the 
Tanzania biosafety regulations is scaring away not only 
local researchers, but also prospective foreign investors 
of GMO technology in the country. 
 
 
NATIONAL BIOSAFETY FRAMEWORK FOR KENYA 
 
Kenya developed regulations and guidelines for biosafety 
in biotechnology since 1998 (RoK, 1998) and ratified the 
CPB in January 2002. The national biosafety framework 
for Kenya (KE-NBF; www.biosafetykenya.co.ke) was 
developed by the national council for science and 
technology (NCST; www.ncst.go.ke) in September 2002 
through funding and technical assistance from the UNEP-
GEF (RoK, 2003).  
 
 
Biosafety regulation in Kenya 
 
Kenya has developed a number of policy and legal 
documents to operationalize its regulatory system. They 
include the National Biotechnology And Biosafety Policy 
(2007) and Biosafety Law (2009). The Kenya Biosafety 
Act (2009) created the National Biosafety Authority, 
which was operationalized in 2009/2010 financial year 
(Macharia, 2005; RoK, 2009; Kingiri and Ayele, 2009). 
There has been a comparatively good political will in 





gazetted. It is noteworthy that in the liability and redress 
clauses, the Kenyan biosafety regulations opt for „fault-
based‟ rather than „strict‟ regimes. Applications to import 
or release GMOs are submitted to IBC where they are 
reviewed and assessed for compliance with the 
guidelines before they are submitted to NBC and finally to 
NCST (now those powers have been handled over to the 
newly formed national biosafety authority) for approval. 
Over ten applications have been processed so far 
(Traynor and Macharia, 2003; Macharia, 2005, 2010). 
The GMO applications/projects that have already been 
approved in Kenya include improved sorghum protein 
quality, cowpea protected from pod borer, cassava 
containing pro-vitamin A, water efficient maize, cassava 
resistant to mosaic virus, weevil resistant sweet potato, 
and insect resistant Bt cotton. The limitations in 
processing GMOs–related applications in Kenya include 
inadequate qualified potential applicants, insufficient 
competence on the part of experts who evaluate 
applications and public awareness is rather slow due to 
financial constrains (Harsh, 2005; Macharia, 2010).  
 
 
KE-NBF institutional arrangement 
 
The National Biosafety Authority (NBA; 
www.biosafetykenya.co.ke) is the national focal point on 
GMOs regulation in Kenya. Its main task is to 
acknowledge receipt and screen applications. The 
competent authorities are charged to do risk assessment. 
The 16-member Kenya National Biosafety Committee 
(NBC) (constituted in 1998) consists of experts drawn 
from the national council for science and technology 
(NCST; www.ncst.go.ke), National Environmental 
Management Authority (NEMA; www.nema.go.ke), Kenya 
Bureau of Standards (KEBS; www.kebs.org); together 
with ministerial agencies responsible for biotechnology 
and biosafety. Nominees from producers and consumers 
are also members of NBC. The Institutional Biosafety 
Committees (IBCs) are also formed out of institutions‟ 
multidisciplinary teams (RoK, 1998, 2009). 
The Kenya‟s biosafety systems have been considered 
to be rather weak (Kingiri and Ayele, 2009). They could 
be improved further if the following are considered: 
Intensification of public awareness and participation, 
harmonization and consensus building among 
biotechnology and biosafety institutions and capacity 




NATIONAL BIOSAFETY FRAMEWORK FOR UGANDA 
 
During 1998 to 1999, the Uganda Council for Science 
and Technology (UCST; www.uncst.go.ug) undertook a 
country study with support from UNEP-GEF to develop 





www.unep.org/biosafety/Documents/NBFs) which was 
adopted by the Ministry of Environment in March 2001 
(UCST, 2000). The project also resulted to formulation of 
the Uganda National Biotechnology and Biosafety (BAB) 
Policy in 2008 (www.absfafrica.org) consistent with the 
national environmental Act (1995) and the CPB (2000). 
The objective of the BAB Policy is to provide regulatory 
and institutional framework for sustainable and safe 




Biosafety regulation in Uganda 
 
In Uganda, It is noteworthy that there is no biotechnology 
and biosafety law in place yet, but a Biosafety Bill is 
being drafted (www.uncst.go.ug, cited August, 2011). 
Meanwhile, there are some biosafety regulatory interim 
arrangements under provisions of the BAB Policy and the 
National S and T Act (Cap 209). The interim biosafety 
regulatory system is coordinated by Uganda National 
Council for Science and Technology (UNCST). The NBC 
is the national administrative body on matters related to 
biosafety (RoU, 2004a; Nampala et al., 2005; Wafula and 
Clark, 2005). Several guiding documents such the 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) for contained and 
confined experiments are also available. The Biosafety 
Bill will provide a more unified approach to biosafety in 
biotechnology research. The national guidelines related 
to biosafety include the national guidelines for 
containment; for regulation of research with genetically 
modified organisms and microbes (2007); for confined 
field trials; for field experiments with genetically 
engineered plants (2006); procedures and forms for field 
experiments with genetically engineered crops (2006); 
biosafety inspection Manual for field experiments 
involving genetically engineered crops (2007); and crop 






The biotechnology and biosafety national competent 
authority in Uganda is the UNCST. It is responsible for 
issuing permits for applications on GMOs and is advised 
by the national biotechnology advisory committee (NBAC; 
(www.absfafrica.org) on biotechnology and biosafety 
policy matters (RoU, 2002). The national biosafety 
committee (NBC) has 15 members derived from different 
relevant disciplines. Established in 1996, NBC derives 
itslegal status from the UNCST statute of 1990. It 
provides technical advice on biosafety issues to the 
government and maintains links with biotechnology 
research centers (RoU, 2002, 2004a, b). The formation of 
Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) is guided by the 
BAB    Policy.    Its    members    are     drawn     from     a  




heterogeneous pool of experts from relevant ministries, 
including the end-users of GMO technology. It reviews 
Biotechnology research proposals and applications for 
contained and confined trials, and prescribes appropriate 
containment/confinement requirements, and spells out 
conditions for approval. So far, NBC has approved 5 
confined field trials (CFTs) and 5 applications are under 
review. The approved GMO projects are: Black Sigatoka 
disease resistance in East African Highland Bananas 
(EAHBs); herbicide tolerant cotton - RR Flex™; Bt Cotton 
- Bollgard™; bio-fortified EAHBs (Iron, Pro-Vit A, Vit E); 
and virus resistant cassava (CMD). The applications 
under review are: BXW resistant banana, drought tolerant 
maize, virus resistant cassava (CBSV) and virus resistant 
sweet potato (www.uncst.go.ug; RoU, 2002, 2004a, b). 
Uganda needs to speed up the process of having the 
Biosafety Bill passed. It also needs to strengthen its 
national capacity for biosafety monitoring and 
enforcement, and develop appropriate training programs 
related to biosafety for its regulators in order to contribute 
technical expertise in a sustainable manner. Furthermore, 
there is a need to bring about a broader perspective of 
biosafety, which balances benefits against risks 
(Sengooba et al., 2005; www.bio-earn.org). 
 
 
NATIONAL BIOSAFETY FRAMEWORK FOR ETHIOPIA 
 
Ethiopia ratified and became a member of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1994 and the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2004. It also joined 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 
1998. The Ethiopia‟s NBF is a combination of 
government sectoral and cross-sectoral environmental 
and biotechnology policy provisions. It is also in line with 
the Ethiopian constitution. It was drafted by the 
environmental protection authority of Ethiopia in 2007 
(EPA, 2007; http://www.unep.org/biosafety) under the 
UNEP-GEF financial grant, and was recently endorsed by 
the Ethiopian parliament, with the objective of regulating 
the possible adverse impacts of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) on biological diversity, human health 
and the environment (www.et.undp.org).  
 
 
Biosafety regulatory framework in Ethiopia 
 
In Ethiopia, the biosafety regulatory regime, which is 
based on the Precautionary Principle, is set to protect 
human and animal health, biological diversity and the 
environment at large against the adverse effects of GMO  
and products thereof. The draft Biosafety 
Regulations/Proclamation document is aimed at 
regulating all transactions related to GMOs including 
import, export, transit, confined and contained use, 
release, transport or placing on the market any GMO or 
its products whether intended for use in  the  environment  




or for use as pharmaceutical, for food, feed or processing 
(EPA, 2007). Article 8 of the Biosafety 
Regulation/Proclamation states that the initial steps that 
should be taken in relation to any transaction of GMOs or 
products is to obtain an Advanced Informed Agreement 
(AIA) from the EPA. The regulations further set directives 
in management of GMOs. These directives are: the 
directive to determine the contents of an application or 
transactions involving GMOs or their products, the 
directive on risk assessment parameters of GMOs or 
their products, the directive on risk management 
schemes, the directive on the application for transport of 
GMOs or their products, the directive for the storage of 
GMOs or their products, and the directive for emergency 
measures for accidental release of GMOs or their 
products. As per the draft Biosafety Bill, all requests 
pertaining to transactions of GMOs should be made as a 
written application to EPA. The applicant is required to 
undertake risk assessment and submit a report and other 
necessary documents. EPA disseminates the report to 
experts as well as availing it to the general public to 
solicit comments before making final decision on whether 
to approve or reject the application.  
Monitoring and enforcement of the regulations and 
directives are the responsibility of EPA, which appoints 
regulatory and enforcement experts. Article 29 of the 
Biosafety Regulations/Proclamation emphasizes on the 
CPB‟s Strict Liability and Redress clauses, stating that: 
“A person who is engaged in any transaction related to 
GMO or its products shall be strictly liable for any harm 
caused. Liability also extends to the provider, supplier or 
developer of the GMO or its products that has caused 






The competent authority responsible for administrative 
system pertaining to all matters related to GMOs 
including to handling notifications or requests for all 
research and development activities, import, export, 
transit, handling, release, contained use, transport and 
placing in the market are charged to the environmental 
protection authority (EPA). The same body is also 
responsible for setting up mechanisms of enforcement 
and monitoring of GMOs and public awareness and 
participation (EPA, 2007). Under EPA, the national 
coordinating committee (NCC) consisting of 33 members 
is constituted. It is drawn from diverse professions 
serving in federal and regional offices, Universities and 
research institutions. The establishment of the Ethiopian 
Intellectual Property Office in 2003 for implementation of 
intellectual property issues could also be considered as 
one step forward in biosafety initiatives (Kassa, 2011). 
Currently, there is no stand-alone policy on biosafety in 





major issues related to biosafety. Such policies are the 
Constitution of Ethiopia, national environmental policy 
(1997; www.phe-ethiopia.org), national science and 
technology policy, national biodiversity conservations and 
research policy and agricultural research policy. All these 
policies are relevant when it comes to safe use of modern 
biotechnology including importation and exportation of 
biotechnological products and are implemented by 
relevant bodies within the responsible ministries.  
In terms of regional cooperation and integration 
initiatives, Ethiopia has joined the world intellectual 
property organization (WIPO) in 1998 and the treaty 
establishing the common market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1994. It is also a member 
of the partnership agreement between members of the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states and 
the European Union (EU), and has applied to become a 
member of WTO. However, the existing IPR legislations 
have to be in accordance to the agreement on trade 
related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS). It 
is only after sorting out such discrepancies related to 
international treaties that the country can attract private 
companies involved in new technologies including 
biotechnology and biosafety research, development and 
trading (Kassa, 2011). 
Public awareness and participation are facilitated by 
EPA to ensure that the public is made aware of any GMO 
transactions. Reasonable time is allowed for public 
interaction and inputs before any decision is made. The 
planned national biosafety clearing house (BCH) will 
serve as a public awareness instrument for all information 
regarding GMOs or products. More public education 
programs involving mass media and training on biosafety 
at tertiary level will also be created (EPA, 2007).  
Overall, Ethiopia has moved in the right direction as far 
as setting up legal and institutional frameworks for 
biosafety is concerned. However, there is a feeling 
among local researchers as well as foreign would-be 
GMO investors that the draft biosafety bill is rather too 
restrictive, and would limit rather than advance modern 
biotechnology (Kassa, 2011). It remains to be seen how 
these regulations will impact on biotechnology research 
and development in Ethiopia.  
 
 
NATIONAL BIOSAFETY FRAMEWORK FOR RWANDA 
 
The national biosafety framework (NBF) for Rwanda was 
developed in 2005 by the national coordinating 
committee (NCC) under the Ministry of State in charge of 
lands and environment. financial and technical assistance 
to carry out the project was obtained from UNEP/GEF. 
The project was accomplished in August 2005. It has 
been developed not only to fulfil the requirements for 
CPB, but also to ensure that Rwanda intensifies safe 
application of modern biotechnology and derives 
optimum benefits from it (RoR, 2005; 





The NBF for Rwanda has 3 main components: The 
national biosafety policy, which highlights how 
biotechnology fits in the national development framework; 
the legal and administrative mechanisms for 
biotechnology and biosafety development in Rwanda, 
including the national biosafety bill and guidelines which 
operationalize the policy and provides regulatory regime 
for ensuring that biotechnology development in Rwanda 
is safe for human health, the environment and the 
economy; and the institutional framework spelling out 
responsibilities and mandates of stakeholder institutions. 
The main objectives of Rwanda‟s NBF are: To put in 
place appropriate policy, regulatory and institutional 
mechanisms to assist the country to optimise the 
potential benefits from modern biotechnology; and to 
ensure that biotechnology activities are undertaken in 
safe, participatory and transparent manner in order to 
prevent risks associated with modern biotechnology 
(RoR, 2005). The components on NBF include the 
national biotechnology and biosaftety policy and the 
national biosafety guidelines. These policies were 
developed in line with the country‟s Vision 2020, the 




Legal framework  
 
The biosafety bill has provisions for regulation of import, 
transit, contained and confined trials or placing GMOs on 
the market. It has three major elements: Institutional 
mechanisms for implementing the bill, risk assessment 
and management, and offences and penalties. Advanced 
informed agreement (AIA) is required for GMOs 
applications before entering the country. A permit system 
is issued by the Registrar of Rwanda Environmental 
Management Authority (REMA; www.rema.gov.rw) which 
avails to the BCH particulars of the GMOs that have been 
handled. Article 18 of the Bill mandates all foreign 
applicants to have local collaborating institutions 





The Rwanda‟s Environmental Management Authority 
(REMA) is the national competent authority (NCA) to 
whom all GMO related matters should be addressed, 
while the ministry responsible for environment is the 
national focal point (NFP) for CBD and CPB. It also 
houses the National biosafety committee (NBC), ad-hoc 
committees, and biosafety registrar. The REMA‟s function 
are: To receive, respond or communicate decisions made 
by the NBC of GMOs notifications and applications; to 
establish mechanisms for insuring the appropriate 
handling, dissemination and storage of documents and 
data; and to  promote  public  awareness,  education  and  
involvement   in   the   decision   making    process.    The 
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institutional biosafety committees (IBCs), biosafety 
officers and biosafety inspectors are part of the 
monitoring arrangements set in place (RoR, 2005). 
The five-year (2006 to 2010) plan set for 
implementation of the NBF program components 
contains the following: Institutional set-up, institutional 
and human resources capacity building, monitoring and 
evaluation, and public education and awareness raising. 
Under public awareness and education, public 
participation in the decision making process and public 
access to information are emphasized (RoR, 2005).  
Rwanda faces the challenge of effectively 
operationalizing the NBF‟s policy and legal provisions 
and realizes its objectives. Its five-year program that 
seeks to address the whole range of concerns related to 
developing scientific, technical and institutional capacities 
for the implementation of biosafety measures is proposed 
in the policy and legal framework.  
Overall, the Rwanda‟s NBF is quite elaborate and 
comprehensive. Article 34 of the Biosafety Bill embraces 
the strict liability clauses of the CPB. As it has been the 
case for other countries covered in this study, it is argued 
that GMOs should not be looked at as “hazardous” 
materials, and therefore, for the sake of promoting 
modern biotechnology in the Sub-Saharan Africa in order 
to address the countries‟ development visions, „fault-




NATIONAL BIOSAFETY FRAMEWORK FOR BURUNDI 
 
The national biosafety framework for Burundi was 
prepared by the Ministry of Urban Planning, Tourism and 
Environment through the National Institute of 
Environment and Nature Conservation. Funded and 
supervised by UNEP-GEF Project, and accomplished in 
November 2006, it is a product of Government‟s political 
will to take advantage of the benefits that Burundi can 
draw from modern biotechnology while preserving the 
environment and the health of its population (RoB, 2006; 
www.unep.org/biosafety/files/BINBFrepEN). The 
biosafety policy, developed as part of the NBF, aims at 
protecting the population‟s health, safeguarding 
environment and biodiversity, and assurance of food 
security. Its broad objective conforms to the 
Precautionary Principle contained in the Rio Declaration: 
“To promote the development of modern biotechnology 
around a participatory biosafety system”. Procedures for 
risk assessment and management; GMOs handling, 
transport, packaging and identification are part of the 
NBF. Regulation and enforcement mechanisms involve 
scientists, inspectors and the monitoring committees. 
 
 
Legal and regulatory regime 
 
Burundi do not have in place a specific legislation on 
biotechnology and biosafety, but even before it ratified 
the  CPB,  it  had  various  laws  related to  movement   of  




biological materials. The Burundi‟s Draft Biosafety Bill 
(2006) with 13 chapters and 5 annexes sets the 
fundamental rules meant to guarantee safety of the 
population and the environment against the risks of 
GMOs and their derived products (RoB, 2006). It also 
incorporates the AIA procedure that guarantees the 
possibility of assessing potential adverse effects of 
GMOs before importation. Although the NBF mentions 
that in the Biosafety Bill there are liability provisions, it is 
not elaborated in the NBF text. Therefore, the type of 
liability and redress regime that will be embraced by the 
country is not clear. 
 
 
Decision making mechanisms 
 
The institutional structure of the NBF in Burundi consists 
of the competent national authority (CNA) in the Ministry 
of Urban Panning, Tourism and Environment. Its role is to 
oversee all functions related to biosafety in Burundi. The 
National Institute for Nature Conservation (NINC; 
www.nature-worldwide.info/burundi) plays a role of 
biosafety administration while the National Biosafety 
Consultative Committee (NBCC) assists the minister in 
charge of the Environment on matters related to 
biosafety. The National Biosafety Experts Committee 
(NBEC) is in charge of carrying out risk assessment and 
making recommendations, while the Public Biosafety 
Committee (PBC) is a non-governmental structure 
composed of members from civil society, and their main 
mission is to ensure protection of the environment. The 
National Correspondent of the Cartagena Protocol 
(NCCP), or the focal point, makes the connection 
between the country and Cartagena Protocol Secretariat, 
and achieves his/her mission with collaboration with the 
CNA. Finally, the national correspondent of the Biosafety 
clearing house (FP/BCH) establishes contacts with the 
BCH set up at the international level as per the CPB 
directives.  
Under awareness creation mechanisms, education and 
public involvement in the decision making process, the 
Burundi‟s NBF is set to avail to the public GMO data, 
sensitise the public to be involved in biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources, 
as well as engaging in public education and awareness 
on the GMO-related issues. In the implementation of its  
NBF, Burundi plans to embark on resource mobilization 
and capacity building drives in favour of development of 
biotechnology and Biosafety (RoB, 2006).  
As Burundi moves towards having an operational 
biosafety framework with right policies and regulatory 
regimes in place, its organizational structure, though 
comprehensive, is rather cumbersome compared to other 
countries in the region. In case there is a chance of 
revising the NBF, it would be advisable to streamline its 
institutional structure in view of improving its 








NATIONAL BIOSAFETY FRAMEWORK FOR 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
The national biosafety framework for the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) was developed in December 
2007 by the national coordinating committee (NCC) 
under the trusteeship of the Ministry of Environment, 
Nature Conservation, Water and Forests. Having joined 
the CPB in February 2005, DRC was ready to benefit 
from the UNEP-GEF funding on this activity, so as to 
create conducive regulatory conditions for application of 
modern biotechnology. There is no stand-alone Biosafety 
Policy for DRC, although there are some related policies 
such as the IPR and plant/animal protection policies. The 
NBF, therefore, incorporates the biosafety policy, based 
on the Precautionary/Preventive Principle (DRC, 2007). It 
also adopts the Polluter Pays Principle in its liability and 
redress regimes, aiming at charging the polluter the 
ecological, economic and social costs of pollution. 
Currently, there are no biosafety, legal or regulatory 
regimes in place for DRC. Therefore, the NBF document 
advises the government to draft a Biosafety Bill that 
would incorporate all the necessary ingredients pertaining 
to safe development and application of modern 
biotechnology (DRC, 2007). 
 
 
Administrative structure and system of handling 
requests 
 
The following biosafety institutional arrangement has 
been formulated: The national biosafety focal point is the 
in-charge person responsible for liaison with the CPB. 
The competent national authority (CNA) is responsible to 
make follow-ups and final decisions of any request 
related to GMOs. In DRC, the CNA is constituted by the 
ministries in charge of agriculture and environment. The 
CNA is assisted by the national biosafety consultative 
committee (NBCC), and the scientific and technical 
biosafety committee (STBC). The former leads a 
consultative mechanism to assist the CNA while the latter 
provides scientific and technical advice to facilitate final 
decision making process. The aforementioned-named 
authorities are also responsible for risk assessment and 
management issues. The biosafety clearing house (BCH) 
is in charge of collecting and exchanging scientific, 
technical, ecological and legal information on the trans-
boundary movement of GMOs/LMOs (DRC, 2007).  
The NBF has put in place all mechanisms necessary to 
carry out the follow-up actions, namely monitoring, 
inspection and enforcement under the management 
structure. Some initiatives involved include “bio-vigilance” 
and “safeguarding” mechanisms (DRC, 2007). Under 
public awareness, education and participation  programs, 




Table 1. Basic elements of the national biosafety systems in selected Eastern and Central African countries.  
 




Burundi Biosafety framework (November, 2006). Biosafety bill (2006). 8 
    
DRC Biosafety framework (December, 2007). Biosafety bill (2007). 6 
    
Ethiopia Biosafety framework (August, 2007). Biosafety proclamation (August, 2007). 4 
    
Kenya Biosafety framework (September, 2002). Biosafety policy (2007). Biosafety Act (February, 2009). 5 
    
Rwanda Biosafety framework (August , 2005). Biosafety bill (2006). 5 
    
Tanzania Biosafety framework (2005).Biosafety guidelines (2005). 
Environmental management Act CAP 191 
(2004).  Biosafety regulations (July, 2009). 
5 
    
Uganda 
Biosafety framework (March 2001). Biotechnology and biosafety 
policy (2008). 
Interim arrangements: National S and T Act 





the NBF provides for information dissemination methods, 
general and specialized training opportunities and sets 
different phases for communication, consultation, 
participation and partnership.  
It is praiseworthy that the DRC biosafety framework is 
very elaborate and takes care of almost all the details 
suggested in the Cartagena protocol. However, by 
designating two separate ministries (one responsible for 
food/feed and another on environmental issues) to be the 
national competent authority on biosafety, it might reduce 
its efficiency due to unforeseen bureaucracy. In addition, 
much remains to be done, especially in the areas of 
public awareness and participation, as the public is not 
sufficiently informed on the issues related to 
biotechnology, and unfortunately, NGOs in the DRC are 
rather not interested in biosafety issues (ABSF-AFRICA; 
http://www.absfafrica.org). 
The seven countries covered in this study demonstrate 
their commitment to adhering to the CPB by having in 
their NBFs all the key biosafety elements (Table 1). While 
Kenya and Tanzania are done with all the required legal 
and institutional arrangements, Uganda, Ethiopia, 
Rwanda, Burundi and DRC are still in the process of 
instituting their biosafety laws. 
 
 
Challenges and way forward 
 
The countries covered in this study are among the least 
developed in the world and therefore they are under-
equipped in terms of technical capacity to conduct 
biotechnology and biosafety activities. Human and 
physical infrastructural resources are inadequate, forcing 
them to be dependant of external funding in order to carry 
out most of  the  biosafety  activities.  The  general  public 
awareness on matters pertaining to biosafety is rather 
low. To develop this awareness, there is a need to 
intensify development of human resource needs to 
extend beyond biosafety training in order to cover other 
related areas such as intellectual property rights, 
management and trade. Lack of, or insufficient political 
will is another hurdle. Some governments are undecided, 
and/or sometimes take too long to approve introduction of 
GMOs, even at the level of research, although biosafety 
frameworks are already in place. The „strict liability and 
redress‟ clauses in the CPB, that have been adopted by 
most of the Eastern and Central African countries, have 
become a center of heated debates worldwide. While 
they are set to ensure maximum safety, they are, on the 
other hand, too stringent to the extent that they 
discourage not only foreign investors, but also local 
biotechnology researchers and developers (Cullet, 2006; 
www.ielcr.org). Furthermore, the biosafety laws and 
regulations in Eastern and Central African region are 
fragmented along country lines, each country having its 
own laws and regulations. This trend is contradicting the 
political climate in the region where governments are 
discussing political and economic integration policies 
(www.eac.int). 
Funding of biosafety and biotechnology R and D 
activities in the region should be a top priority of 
governments by engaging in short, medium and long-
term interventions. They should intensify public 
awareness and develop biosafety curricula in all levels of 
education, and also increase support in specialized 
training (Sengooba et al., 2009). The governments 
should further invest and support capacity building 
initiatives in all these areas of biosafety and 
biotechnology initiatives. Awareness campaigns on 
biotechnology and biosafety issues should be intensified  




to cover a wide range of audiences including the decision 
makers, media and the general public. The „strict liability 
and redress clauses in the CPB should be re-examined 
carefully, in view of avoiding hampering home-grown 
and/or imported biotechnologies that are good for the 
countries‟ food security, improved health and poverty 
alleviation in line with the Millennium Development Goals 
2015 (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals), while still 
giving safety a deserving priority.  
The Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on 
liability and redress to the Cartagena Protocol on 
biosafety was adopted in Nagoya, Japan, on 16th 
October 2010; http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/supplementary). 
The new supplementary protocol provides revised 
international rules and procedures on liability and redress 
for damage to biodiversity resulting from living modified 
organisms (LMOs). The g in Uganda, overnments should 
ratify the revised protocol in order to allow them to review 
national laws to revoke, if possible, the „strict‟ liability and 
opt for more user-friendly „fault-based‟ liability clauses. 
There is a need to develop home-grown biotechnology 
and biosafety capacity in order to instill “ownership” of 
thinking into the minds of scientists and policy makers, 
thereby enhancing public trust (Kingiri and Ayele, 2009). 
Furthermore, there is a need to harmonize biosafety 
regulations in the Eastern and Central Africa bloc in line 
with the envisaged approval of political and economic 





This study attempted to review the worldwide biosafety 
systems with special attention to selected Eastern and 
Central African countries namely Tanzania, Kenya, 
Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, with an in-depth look on Tanzania. All 
the countries studied are members to the CBD and CPB, 
and have National Biosafety Frameworks, thanks to the 
UNEP-GEF financial and technical support. The national 
frameworks incorporate all the basic elements namely 
biosafety policies, regulatory regimes, systems to handle 
requests (administrative, risk assessment and 
management, decision making); follow-up actions 
(monitoring, inspections and enforcement), and public 
awareness and participation. The study shows that 
Kenya is leading the group by having all the requirements 
in place, followed by Uganda. Tanzania has cleared the 
legal frameworks hurdles, but it is rather slow in 
processing applications of GMOs for containment and 
confined trials. Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi and DRC are 
still in a process of formulating their biosafety laws. The 
challenges facing the countries in the region are financial 
constraints, insufficient trained human resources, poor 
facilities, low awareness and insufficient political will by 
some governments. In order to timely realize the benefits 





the rather stringent regulatory laws to make them more 
„friendly‟ to local and foreign researchers and investors, 
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